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IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following questions have been presented for review. 
However, since neither presents a "special and important reason" 
requiring this Court's review, the Court should deny this Writ of 
Certiorari and dismiss this case: 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly uphold the 
trial court's decision that a personal representative under a 
will did not commit an actionable breach of her fiduciary duty 
when she used estate funds in accordance with the plain language 
of the will and the testatorfs intent since it caused no real 
damages, even though she did not fund a testamentary bypass trust 
as instructed by the will? 
2. If a will instructs a personal representative to place 
the residue of the estate in trust and orders the trustees to 
invade the principal of the trust and distribute principal to the 
life beneficiary "as is necessary for maintenance and support . . 
. ", may or must the trustee require that the life beneficiary 
deplete her independent assets and resources before the principal 
may be invaded, or is the trustee required to invade the 
principal for any of the beneficiaries necessary living or 
medical expenses? 
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V. OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion in this matter is 
published at the following citation: 
In re Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, Neil R. Mitchell v. Lynda 
Wood, 918 P.2d 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).(attached in Appendix 
" A") 
VI. JURISDICTION 
1. The Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion in this 
matter on May 19, 1996 ("Opinion", attached in Appendix A). 
i 
2. The Utah Court of Appeals denied a Petition for 
Rehearing from petitioner Mitchell on July 19, 1996 (attached in 
Appendix A). 
3. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). 
VII. CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-711 is controlling. (attached in 
Appendix B). 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a claim against the estate of Marjorie S. 
Sims, former personal representative of her husband, G. Grant 
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Sims, by Neil Mitchell, Successor Personal Representative of the 
Estate of G. Grant Sims. Marjorie was the original personal 
representative under the Last Will and Testament of G. Grant Sims 
("Will", attached in Appendix C). Mitchell filed a claim against 
the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, a probate pending in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, under 
Probate No. 933900278ES, claiming breach of fiduciary duty. 
Under the Will, Marjorie was to fund a generation skipping 
trust ("Trust") after Probate and Neil was to serve with her as 
Co-Trustee. Marjorie was the only principal beneficiary of this 
Trust and was to receive, without condition, income from the 
Trust and so much of the principal as was necessary for her 
health, support and maintenance in the standard of living to 
which she had been accustomed during Grant's lifetime. Marjorie 
did not fund the Trust, but withdrew funds from Grant's Estate 
which she used for her health, support and maintenance in 
accordance with the express terms of the Will. Thus, Marjorie's 
withdrawals did not damage the residuary value to the 
Beneficiaries of Grant's Estate. 
On May 8, 1993, Mitchell filed a claim against Marjorie!s 
estate in the amount of $149,509.26 for cash deficiency in 
Grantfs Estate which Wood denied on or about August 18, 1993. 
Neil then filed a Petition and First Amended Petition for 
Allowance of Claim, alleging that Marjorie breached her fiduciary 
duty under Grant's Will and misappropriated his estate funds. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
At the Trial Court, both Mitchell and Wood moved for summary 
judgment on their claims. After oral argument, the Trial Court 
issued its Memorandum Decision granting both Mitchell's and 
Wood's Motions for Summary Judgment in part and denying both in 
part. 
Mitchell filed a Notice of Appeal in the Utah Court of 
Appeals from the part of the Trial Court's Order that denied part 
of Mitchell's Motion and granted part of Wood's Motion. Wood 
filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on the part of the Trial Court's 
Order that denied part of her Motion for Summary Judgment and 
granted part of Mitchell's Motion. 
Following the briefing and oral argument, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the Trial Court's Order awarding Marjorie's 
estate personal representative fees. However, the court upheld 
the trial court's Order denying Mitchell's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granting Wood's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Mitchell petitioned the Court of Appeals for reconsideration 
of the part of the Order denying his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court of Appeals denied that Petition on July 19, 1996. On 
August 19, 1996, Mitchell filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
before this Court. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
G. Grant Sims and his wife, Marjorie, executed identical 
wills on July 22, 1991, when they were both advanced in years and 
confined to their beds in poor health. R. 406-09. They were of 
significant wealth and were concerned in planning their estates 
that they avoid large federal estate taxes. R. 409-11. Thus, 
Grant's Will contained a bypass trust which named Marjorie as co-
trustee with Mitchell, Marjoriefs nephew. R. 271-74. The Will 
also contained specific instructions regarding Marjorie1s care 
and standard of living. R. 270-79. Marjorie1s Will contained 
similar provisions naming Grant as beneficiary and providing for 
his care. R. 271-77, Appellant's Br. at 29. 
On November 14, 1991, Grant died leaving his last Will and 
Testament ("Will") naming Marjorie as Personal Representative and 
Mitchell as Successor Personal Representative. R. 61, 117, 270. 
The Will provided that Marjorie was to fund a trust known as The 
George Grant Sims Estate Tax Bypass Trust ("Trust"). R. 271-77. 
Marjorie and Mitchell were to serve as co-trustees of the Trust. 
R. 271-72. The Trust provisions in the Will mandated that 
Marjorie was entitled to the Trust income without condition and 
that "Trustees shall also distribute as much of the principal as 
is necessary for her proper health, support and maintenance and 
to maintain her in the standard of living that she enjoyed during 
[Grant's] lifetime." R. 272. After all Marjorie!s medical and 
5. 
living expenses were paid from the Trust estate, the remaining 
Trust corpus, if any existed at all, was to be distributed to the 
remaindermen. R. 272. 
During the time Marjorie served as personal representative, 
the Trust was not funded. R. 398, 511. Marjorie was over 82 
years old, confined to her bed and in nearly constant need of 
home nursing care due to her age and poor health. R. 406-08. 
Though she did not fund the Trust, Marjorie drew checks on 
Grant's Estate for her medical and living expenses as provided in 
the Trust. R. 383, 398, 511-12. Of the $96,642.55 which Marge 
drew from Grant's account, $75,439.15 was used exclusively for 
her nursing and medical costs. R. 378, 383, 398. The 
reasonableness of these expenses was established by an affidavit 
by Lynda Wood, who spent extensive amounts of time assisting both 
Grant and Marjorie in their last years. No counter affidavit 
contesting the reasonableness of these expenses was ever offered 
by Mitchell. R. 406-08. 
In addition, Marjorie accepted a $12,445.86 settlement of 
Grant's personal injury settlement and withdrew $52,875.40 on a 
certificate of deposit, plus interest and personal representative 
fees. R. 353-55, 383-84, 387, 400-02. 
On September 2, 1992, Marjorie revoked the will which she 
drafted at the same time as Grant, and signed a new will naming 
Lynda Wood as her Personal Representative and removing Neil from 
her will entirely. Appellant Br., Addendum B. On February 27, 
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1993, the day after she signed the accounting for Grant's Estate, 
Marjorie died. R. 7, 17, 282. 
Following Marjoriefs death, Wood was appointed Personal 
Representative of Marjoriefs Estate and Mitchell was appointed 
Personal Representative of Grant's Estate and both continue in 
those functions. R. 14, 258. On or about May 8, 1993, Mitchell 
filed a claim against Marjorie's Estate which was denied on or 
about August 18, 1993. R. 17, 47, 161. Mitchell followed with a 
Petition and Amended Petition for Allowance of a Claim in Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
moved for summary judgment. R. 50, 207, 345. Wood also moved 
for summary judgment, admitting liability for $48,100.00 of the 
$52,875.40 certificate of deposit, but denying Grant's Estate had 
been damaged by Marjorie's withdrawals for reasonable medical and 
living expenses. R. 380-404. Wood also claimed Marjorie, as 
Grant's only heir at law, was entitled to the settlement of 
Grant's personal injury action. R. 380-404. 
The Trial Court denied and granted both summary judgment 
motions in part. R. 510-15, 520-22. The court concluded that 
Marjorie's Estate was liable for $48,100.00 from the certificate 
of deposit plus the personal injury settlement. R. 511-13. The 
court did not find Marjorie's Estate liable for the remainder of 
the certificate of deposit, as it had not been challenged by "he 
petitioner, or for any damage in failing to fund the Trust. R. 
511-13. 
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Mitchell appealed the Trial Court's Order regarding 
Marjorie's failure to fund the Trust and the remainder of the 
certificate of deposit. R. 510, 523-24. Wood cross-appealed 
regarding the personal injury settlement and related parts of the 
Order. R. 510, 531-32. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court on the 
matter of damage to Grant's Estate for Marjorie's living and 
medical expenses and on the matter of the personal injury 
settlement, but modified the trial court's order by denying 
personal representative's fees claimed by Marjorie for $1910.00. 
See Opinion at Appendix A. 
Mitchell filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this 
Court on August 19, 1996. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari based on "special 
and important reasons'7, pursuant to Rule 46, Utah R. App. P. 
However, for the following reasons, the petitioner has failed to 
show any "special and important reasons'' within the meaning of 
Rule 46. Accordingly, the Court should deny the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. 
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POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS BOUND BY PROCEDURAL LAW TO REJECT 
PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AS PETITIONER 
FAILED TO DISPUTE THAT HE SUFFERED NO DAMAGES. 
The Court of Appeals was bound as a matter of law to uphold 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to Marjoriefs 
living and medical expenses because the petitioner's claim that 
Marjorie ^reached her fiduciary duty failed to prove any real 
damages and therefore was not actionable. Mitchell has claimed 
that the Court of Appeals' holding that Marjoriefs failure to 
fund the Trust as instructed was not actionable since it did not 
result in damages, has excused her breach and thereby "sanctioned 
. . . wholesale disregard for such testamentary instructions." 
Pet'r Pet. for Writ of Cert, at 8. Mitchell has also claimed the 
court failed to consider the ambiguities in Grant's Will and 
remand for the factual determination of Grant's intent. However, 
Mitchell's claims are without merit and do not result in "special 
and important reason[s]" as required for granting a writ of 
certiorari under Rule 46(a), U.R.App.P., for this Court's review. 
First, the Court of Appeals has not excused Marjorie's 
failure to fund the Trust as instructed in Grant's Will. In 
fact, the Court of Appeals made clear that "Mrs. Sims . . . never 
funded the trust. Instead, she withdrew $96,642.55 directly from 
the estate checking account to pay her personal living and 
medical expenses." Matter of Estate of Sims, 318 P.2d 132, 133 
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(Utah App. 1996) . However, without evidence of damages, the 
courts below could not have found the breach actionable. 
The statute upon which petitioner relies for claiming 
Marjorie1s liability requires there be "damage or loss resulting 
from the breach of fiduciary duty." U.C.A. § 75-3-711. In the 
trial court, Wood offered affidavits and other evidence to show 
that Marjorie used the estate funds in strict accordance with the 
clear language of the Will and the testator!s intent. Petitioner 
did not contest these facts with affidavits or any other evidence 
proving Marjoriefs breach resulted in damages. 
The Court of Appeals found that "[bjecause Mitchell did not 
challenge Mrs. Sims' expenses below, he is precluded from 
challenging them on appeal." Id. at 135. See Jensen v. Bowcut, 
892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 
1995). Without any proof that the failure to fund the Trust 
resulted in damages, the Court of Appeals concluded "we agree 
with the trial court's determination that, ^while there was a 
technical breach of her fiduciary responsibilities to fund the 
bypass trust, the breach resulted in no damages and therefore is 
not actionable.''' Id. 
Second, despite petitioner's allegations, the Court or 
Appeals has not ignored the language and intent of Grant's Will. 
The Court of Appeals looked at the language of the Will, the 
relationship between Grant and his wife versus his wife's distant 
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relatives, and the judicial preference benefiting a spouse over 
an unrelated remainderman. See Purdue v. Roberts, 314 So.2d 280 
(Ala. 1975). Wood presented evidence that the plain language of 
the Will ordered rather than permitted the disbursements of 
principal for medical and living expenses. She also presented 
evidence that the circumstances at the time Grant executed his 
Will showed Grant intended to provide for his wife's health care 
and living expenses first and foremost. Mitchell offered no 
contradictory evidence. 
Even if Grant had intended his wife to exhaust all her own 
resources to preserve his estate for his wife's distant 
relatives, the courts below were not at liberty to disregard the 
statutory requirement of damages for a finding of liability to 
create an action for petitioner. The Court of Appeals1 analysis 
was as thorough and precise as possible under the statutory 
requirement that there be proof of damages in order to find 
liability for a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Accor ngly, there is nothing in this matter which is 
"special or important" warranting this Court's attention. 
Procedurally, the Court of Appeals was bound by Utah statute and 
could not allow the claim to proceed without a showing of 
damages. The Court should reject the Petition on this point. 
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POINT II 
THE TREND IN CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT PETITIONER'S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "AS IS NECESSARY", 
NOR DOES IT NECESSITATE THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS. 
Petitioner has claimed that the lower courts1 interpretation 
of the phrase "as is necessary" taken from Grant's Will which 
modified the trustees obligation to invade the principal for 
Marjorie's health, support and maintenance, has raised an issue 
that this Court must review. Mitchell has alleged that Grant's 
Will required the beneficiary to deplete ail her own resources 
before accessing the Trust principal. Both the Trial Court and 
the Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation of the phrase 
"as is necessary". Because the language in the Will was 
unambiguous and modern case law from several jurisdictions 
contradicts Mitchell's explanation, there is no "special and 
important reason" for this Court to analyze the phrase "as is 
necessary" and the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be 
denied. 
The phrase "as is necessary" in the context of a trustee's 
power to invade trust principal on a beneficiary's behalf, has 
been well reviewed by many courts more recently than the Dunklee 
decision upon which petitioner relies.1 The overwhelming trend 
1
 Petitioner has cited several cases in addition to 
Dunklee which were noted for the Court of Appeals. All are 
irrelevant to the issue at hand. In In re Martin's Will, 199 
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since the 1950fs contradicts petitioner's reading of the phrase.2 
The Court of Appeals looked to a recent Montana case, Estate 
of Lindaren. 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1994). As the conservator of a 
testamentary trust, a beneficiary petitioned for an order 
requiring the trustee to pay the beneficiary's nursing home 
expenses, burial and funeral costs. The trustee pointed to the 
language of the trust limiting disbursement of the principal as 
"necessary for her support, care and health during her lifetime," 
N.E. 491 (N.Y. 1936), the language of will authorized 
disbursements of the corpus to the beneficiary, the testator's 
cousin rather than his spouse, "as she may require" and not "as 
is necessary". 
In In re Seacrist's Estate, 66 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1949), the 
testator authorized, but did not mandate, the invasion of trust 
principal only if one of the beneficiaries became disabled with a 
doctor's certification, and then only to a limit of $1,000.00 per 
year. 
Board of Visitors v. Safe Deposit and Trust Company, 46 A.2d 
280 (Md. Ct. App. 1946), involved testamentary language allowing, 
not requiring, the trustees, in their own discretion, to 
distribute principal for his wife "if she needs it". 
The language in Bridgeport City Trust Company v. Beech, 17 
A. 308 (Conn. 1934), is discretionary and only authorizes 
invasion of the principal which is necessary for his sons' 
comfortable support. 
In In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 1969), the 
invasion of principal was conditional upon the beneficiary's 
"sufficient moneys" and was also permissive rather than 
mandatory. 
All the cases cited in footnote by Petitioner were cited 
before the Court of Appeals and therefore present no new reasons 
justifying this Court's review. 
2. In addition to Godfrey and Lindgren discussed herein, 
the Court should also note Taylor v. Hutchinson, 497 P.2d 527 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1972; Estate of Wells v. Sanford, 663 S.W.2d 174 
(Ark, 1984); Neilson v. Duyveionck, 263 N.E.2d 743 (111. App. 
Ct. 1968); Estate of Dodae v. Scott, 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1979); 
In re Coats Estate, 581 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); and see 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 128, comment e (1957). 
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and argued this language required the beneficiary to show 
financial need. The Montana Supreme Court disagreed. 
We will not interpret the liberal Trust language by way 
of a limited reading of the word 'necessary' referred to by 
the [trial] court as 'need'. The Trust does not provide for 
the expenditure of Beneficiary's estate before any payments 
are to be received from this trust. 
Id. at 1282-83. 
Additionally, the courts below considered Godfrey v. 
Chandley, 811 P.2d 1248 (Kansas 1991). This Kansas Supreme Court 
case reviewed a will that left a trust beneficiary the rights to 
the trust principal "as may be necessary for her support, health 
and maintenance." That court looked to a long line of cases 
supporting the rule that "where a settlor directs the trustee to 
pay the beneficiary so much as is necessary for support and 
maintenance, an inference arises that the settlor intended the 
beneficiary to receive support from the trust estate, regardless 
of other income." Id. at 1251. 
The courts below have followed these well reasoned cases. 
In contrast, Mitchell has asked this Court to reconsider the 
decisions below based on an outdated distinguishable case, 
Dunklee v. Kettering, 225 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1950). In Dunklee, the 
Colorado Supreme Court interpreted a will in which "[ijnstead of 
directing the trustee to pay the beneficiary a sum to cover such 
necessities, she merely 'authorized' him to provide him with the 
necessities of life' as may be necessary." Id. at 854. Because 
the language of the Will made the invasion of the principal 
14 
permissive rather than necessary, and since the beneficiary was 
cared for well beyond the basic necessities of life, the court 
concluded he did not need the estate's support. 
The Godfrey court distinguished Dunklee on the facts and 
circumstances "where the settlor manifests an intention that the 
trust property be applied to the beneficiary's support only if 
and to the extent the beneficiary is in actual need." Godfrey at 
1251. Clearly, the Court of Appeals was correct in 
distinguishing this case for rhe same reasons. 
The analysis of the phrase "as is necessary" is not a 
"special or important" task requiring this Court's attention. 
Its meaning is clear on the face of the Will and the phrase has 
been thoughtfully considered more recently than petitioner 
indicates by several courts in different jurisdictions. The 
cases cited by Petitioner are all distinguishable from the case 
at hand because the language of the Will in this case makes clear 
that Grant intended to provide for all his wife's necessary 
medical and living expenses. The cases cited by Petitioner, 
then, are not conflicting with the Court of Appeals. Thus, there 
is no "special and important reason" requiring this Court's time 
and resources and Mitchell's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
should be denied. 
JL5L 
2L CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Utah Supreme Court is not 
faced with "special and important" matters for decision and the 
Court should deny this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The 
Court of Appeals could not have made Mitchell's claim actionable 
as Mitchell failed to show that Marjorie's expenses were not 
reasonable under the terms of the Will and failed to dispute that 
no damage resulted to Grant's Estate from Marjorie's withdrawals. 
Also, the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed Grant's intent to 
benefit his wife over the distant remaindermen, as evidenced by 
the language of his Will and other surrounding circumstances. 
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial court's 
interpretation of the phrase "as is necessary", requiring that 
the expenditure be necessary, not that the beneficiary deplete 
her entire estate before accessing her late husband's assets. 
This ruling is clear from the plain language of the Will and is 
well supported by the case law of several other jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, there is no "special and important reason" for 
this Court to review this matter and the Court should deny 
Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
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132 Utah 918 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF 
Marjorie S. SIMS, Deceased. 
Neil MITCHELL, Appellant 
and Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
Lynda WOOD, Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant. 
No. 950734-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 16, 1996. 
Co-trustee and remainderman of dece-
dent's husband's estate brought claim 
against decedent's estate for monies removed 
from husband's estate. Co-trustee and re-
mainderman and personal representative for 
decedent's estate cross-moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court, Third Dis-
trict, Salt Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson, 
J., granted in part and denied in part both 
motions. Parties cross-appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) dece-
dent's estate was not required to remit to 
husband's estate funds decedent had with-
drawn from husband's estate's checking ac-
count; (2) decedent's estate was not entitled 
to personal representative fee award from 
husband's estate; (3) decedent's estate was 
entitled to retain interest earned on certifi-
cate of deposit that had been part of hus-
band's estate; and (4) decedent was not enti-
tled to receive settlement from testator's 
personal injury claim. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <^842(1) 
Inasmuch as entitlement to summary 
judgment is question of law, reviewing court 
accords no deference to trial court's resolu-
tion of legal issues presented. 
2. Executors and Adnr^Tstrators <£=>81 
Although persons nresentative's fail-
ure to fund husbanr estamentarv tmct 
quired to remit to husband's estate ftm^ 
personal representative withdrew from hus-
band's estate checking account, given ^gj 
provision that personal representative was 
entitled to trust principal as needed for her 
medical and living expenses and trial comfs 
finding that withdrawn funds were used for 
personal representative's support and main-
tenance. 
3. Executors and Administrators <3=>256<4) 
Trust residuary beneficiary, whose claim 
against settlor's surviving spouse's estate for 
monies she removed from settlor's estate was 
denied, was precluded on appeal of that deni-
al from challenging medical and living ex-
penses of spouse, who, pursuant to settlors 
will, was entitled to distributions of trusr 
principal to extent required for such ex-
penses, by his failure to challenge expenses 
below. 
4. Appeal and Error <3=>170(1) 
Appellate court would not address estop-
pel argument raised for first time on appeal, 
despite appellant's contention that issue was 
not new even though argument was. 
5. Executors and Administrators <2>501 
Judgment <S=>185.3(1) 
Estate of personal representative of tes-
tator's estate was not entitled to personai 
representative fee award from testator's es-
tate when personal representative's estate 
failed to provide evidence to support award 
after co-trustee and residuary beneficiary rf 
testator's testamentary trust challenged fees 
on summary judgment. Rules Civ.Proc-
Rule 56(c). 
6. Executors and Administrators <s=*313 
. Interest earned on certificate of deporf 
that was part of testator's estate was proper 
ly retained by testator's spouse's estate, e** 
though spouse, as personal represents^ 
had failed to fund testator's testament*? 
trust, given will provision granting spofl* 
right to receive estate's income without <*** 
dition. 
7. Executors and Administrators <s=*49 
MATTER OF ESTATE OF SIMS 
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testator's personal injury claim on ground 
that she paid large portion of testator's medi-
cal expenses; under survival statute, spouse 
could recover settlement only in her capacity 
as personal representative on behalf of es-
tate, and could then present claim to estate 
for out-of-pocket expenses. U.CA.1953, 78-
ll-12(l)(b). 
8. Death G=>7 
In wrongful death cause of action, heirs 
of decedent personally hold claims for lost 
support and other personal losses, while in 
personal injury case, cause of action is owned 
not by heirs, but by injured party. 
9. Descent and Distribution @»45 
Testator's surviving spouse could not 
take testator's personal injury settlement as 
testator's only surviving intestate heir; testa-
tor, who had will that designated spouse as 
personal representative and devisee of per-
sonal property, did not die intestate. 
John E. Gates, Kim R. Wilson, and David 
L. Pinkston, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
and Cross-Appellee. 
John L. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for Appel-
lee and Cross-appellant. 
Before DAVIS, BENCH and JACKSON, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Neil Mitchell appeals the trial court's entry 
of summary judgment in favor of Marjorie 
Sims's estate. Lynda Wood cross-appeals. 
We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND 
Grant and Marjorie Sims enjoyed a long 
married life together. Mr. Sims died in 
1991, leaving a will which provided for the 
creation of a bypass trust and designated 
Mrs. Sims the personal representative of his 
estate. He also named Mrs. Sims and Mitch-
ell co-trustees of the bypass trust, which was 
to be funded from the residue of his estate. 
The will provided that trust income was to be 
paid to Mrs. Sims, without condition. The 
will further provided that the trustees were 
required to distribute to Mrs. Sims as much 
of the principal as necessary for her proper 
health, support, and maintenance. After 
Mrs. Sims's death, the residue of the trust's 
corpus was to be distributed to other benefi-
ciaries, including both Mitchell and Wood. 
During the time that Mrs. Sims served as 
personal representative, she never funded 
the trust. Instead, she withdrew $96,642.55 
directly from the estate checking account to 
pay for her personal living and medical ex-
penses. Mrs. Sims received an additional 
$52,875.40 from the estate, derived from a 
$50,000 certificate of deposit plus interest. 
Finally, Mrs. Sims received a $12,445.86 per-
sonal injury settlement for injuries Mr. Sims 
had sustained before his death. 
Mrs. Sims died in 1993. Her will named 
Wood as the personal representative of her 
estate. Mitchell, as co-trustee and a remain-
der person of Mr. Sims's estate, filed a claim 
against Mrs. Sims's estate for the monies 
that Mrs. Sims had removed from Mr. Sims's 
estate. Wood conceded that $48,100 from 
the certificate of deposit in Mr. Sims's name 
had been wrongfully taken from Mr. Sims's 
estate.1 Mitchell moved for summary judg-
ment for return of all the funds removed 
from Mr. Sims's estate. Wood also filed for 
summary judgment seeking to disallow 
Mitchell's claim. 
The trial court granted in part and denied 
in part both parties' motions for summary 
judgment. The trial court found that Mrs. 
Sims had failed to fund the trust, but that 
she was nonetheless entitled to the $96,-
642.55 from the estate checking account. 
The trial court determined that the funds 
were used for her necessary support and 
maintenance and that there was therefore no 
damage to Mr. Sims's estate. Regarding the 
certificate of deposit, the trial court found 
that $48,100 was undisputedly owed by Mrs. 
Sims's estate and ordered that amount paid 
I. Wood argued that Mrs. Sims's estate was enti-
ded to the $2875.40 in interest and an additional 
$1900 as personal representative fees. 
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to Mr. Sims's estate plus 10% interest. The 
trial court also allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to 
retain the $2875.40 in interest income from 
the certificate of deposit and the $1900 
claimed as personal representative fees. Fi-
nally, the trial court found that Mrs. Sims's 
acceptance of the $12,445.86 personal injury 
settlement was an improper diversion of the 
money from Mr. Sims's estate and awarded 
that amount to Mr. Sims's estate. 
Mitchell appeals from the trial court's deci-
sion concerning the $96,642.55 that Mrs. 
Sims withdrew from the estate checking ac-
count and the allowance of interest income 
and personal representative fees from the 
certificate of deposit Wood cross-appeals 
the trial court's summary judgment in favor 
of Mr. Sims's estate on the personal injury 
settlement amount and award of interest. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Because entitle-
ment to summary judgment is a question of 
lawt we accord no deference to the trial 
court's resolution of the legal issues present-
ed. Id; Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1989). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Estate Checking Account 
[2] Mitchell first argues that the trial 
court erred when it allowed Mrs. Sims's es-
tate to keep the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims 
had drawn from the checking account of Mr. 
Sims's estate. Mitchell contends that be-
cause Mrs. Sims did not fund the trust pro-
vided for in Mr. Sims's will, she must return 
all the money to Mr. Sims's estate. We 
disagree. 
[3,4] Mr. Sims declared in his will that 
2. Mitchell also claims that r^od should be es-
topped from claiming Mrc IS'S estate had no 
[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs, 
Sims] without any conditions, all of the 
income of said trust The trustees shall 
also distribute as much of the principal as 
is necessary for her proper health, sup-
port, and maintenance and to maintain her 
in the standard of living that she enjoyed 
during my lifetime. 
The trial court found that although Mrs. 
Sims did not fund the trust, she was entitled 
to the funds since they were used for her 
support and maintenance. The record re-
flects that Mrs. Sims spent approximately 
$76,000 from the estate's checking account on 
her medical expenses. The balance of the 
money drawn from the estate's checking ac-
count was for Mrs. Sims's living expenses. 
The accounting report and affidavit of the 
accountant for Mr. Sims's estate confirm 
these expenses. Mitchell did not dispute 
Mrs. Sims's expenses, contending merely 
that the expense accounting was irrelevant 
because any money used was "improperly 
converted from the estate." Because Mitch-
ell did not challenge Mrs. Sims's expenses 
below, he is precluded from challenging them 
on appeal. Jensen v. Botvcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 
1056 (Utah App.Xholding acquiescence to op-
posing argument before trial court precluded 
challenge on appeal), cert, denied 899 P.2d 
1231 (Utah 1995); see also Salt Lake City v. 
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (stating 
court will review only those issues presented 
below unless exceptional circumstances or 
plain error are shown).2 
The language of the will clearly states that 
Mrs. Sims shall receive distributions from 
the principal of Mr. Sims's estate "necessary 
for her proper health, support, and mainte-
nance." Mitchell argues that, in other juris-
dictions, the use of "as is necessary" lan-
guage requires the beneficiaries of a trust to 
exhaust their own resources before invading 
trust principal. See Dunklee v. Kettering, 
123 Colo. 43, 225 P.2d 853, 855-57 (1950). 
But see In re Estate of Lindgren, 268 Mont. 
96, 885 P.2d 1280, 1282-83 (1994). We need 
not address that question because Mr. Sims's 
decline to honor such a distinction." Ong Int'l 
(U.SA.) Inc. V. 11th AVP Cnm RSO P 1A AA1 AS* 
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will does not merely authorize the invasion of 
the principal for "the necessities of life." 
Dunklee, 225 P2d at 853. Instead, Mr. 
Sims's witf mandates that Mrs. Sims shall 
have access to the principal "to maintain her 
[Mrs. Sims] in the standard of living that she 
enjoyed during my lifetime." Therefore, we 
agree with the trial court's determination 
that <4while there was a technical breach of 
her fiduciary responsibilities to fund the by-
pass trust, the breach resulted in no damages 
and therefore is not actionable." 
B. Certificate of Deposit 
[5] Mitchell challenges the trial court's 
award to Mrs. Sims's estate of $1900 in per-
sonal representative fees and $2875.40 that 
Mrs. Sims claimed as interest earned from 
Mr. Sims's $50,000 certificate of deposit. 
Mitchell first argues that Mrs. Sims's estate 
did not properly petition the trial court for 
the $1900 in claimed personal representative 
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
718(1) (1993). Wood stated in her Memoran-
dum in Response to Mitchell's Motion for 
Summary Judgment that she deducted from 
the $50,000 "$19G0 as fees for acting as per-
sonal representative." We need not decide 
whether this qualifies as a proper claim pur-
suant to section 75-3-718(1), since Wood pro-
vided no evidence to support the fees after 
Mitchell challenged them on summary judg-
ment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Conse-
quently, we reverse that portion of the 
award. 
[6] Mitchell also asserts that the trial 
court improperly awarded Mrs. Sims's estate 
$2875.40 in claimed interest from the certifi-
cate of deposit. Wood argues that the mon-
ey was interest earned from the certificate of 
deposit in Mr. Sims's name and that, since 
Mr. Sims's will declared Mrs. Sims the bene-
ficiary of all income from Mr. Sims's estate, 
she was entitled to keep the interest earned. 
Mitchell simply contends that because the 
trust was not funded, Mrs. Sims did not have 
the right to keep that money. We disagree. 
Again, although Mrs. Sims did not fund the 
trust as Mr. Sims's wiD directed, Mr. Sims 
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explicitly stated that Mrs. Sims was to re-
ceive the income from Mr. Sims's estate 
"without condition." Thus, the trial court 
properly allowed Jjrs. Sims's estate to retain 
the interest from the certificate of deposit. 
C. Settlement Pre is 
[7-9] Wood cross-appeals e trial court's 
order to return to Mr. Si s estate the 
$12,445.86 received from the settlement of 
Mr. Sims's personal injury claim. Wood ar-
gues that since Mrs. Sims claims to have paid 
a large portion of Mr. Sims's medical ex-
penses, Mrs. Sims could retain the settle-
ment proceeds pursuant to Utah's survival 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 
(1992). Utah's survival statute provides: 
If prior to judgment or settlement the 
injured person dies as a result of a cause 
other than the injury received as a result 
of the wrongful act or negligence of the 
wrongdoer, the personal representative or 
heirs of that person are entitled to receive 
no more than the out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred by or on behalf of that injured 
person as the result of his injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b) (1992). 
According to Utah's survival statute, Mrs. 
Sims could only recover the personal injury 
settlement in her capacity as personal repre-
sentative of Mr. Sims's estate. Wood's reli-
ance on In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 
213 P.2d 657 (1950) for the argument that 
she is entitled to the settlement proceeds is 
misplaced. Behm is a wrongful death case 
and not a personal injury settlement case. 
In a wrongful death cause of action, the heirs 
of the decedent personally hold claims for 
lost support and other personal losses. See 
Haro v. Haro, 887 ?2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 
1994). In a personal injury case, by compari-
son, the cause of action is owned not by the 
heirs, but by the injured party. As personal 
representative of Mr. Sims's estate, Mrs. 
Sims was therefore authorized to receive the 
settlement only on behalf of his estate. Mrs. 
Sims could then present a claim to his estate 
for out-of-pocket expenses, pursuant to the 
survival statute. She has never done that.3 
3« Mrs. Sims's estate argues that because she was is evident that Mr. Sims d\A not Ait» int#»«tat#> 
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We therefore affirm the trial court's award of 
the settlement proceeds to Mr. Sims's estate. 
We have considered the other issues 
raised, and we adjudge them to be without 
merit. Accordingly, we do not address them. 
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 
1989) ("Court need not analyze and address 
in writing each and every argument, issue or 
claim raised.**), cert denied, — UJS. , 
116 S.Ct. 163,133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995). 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the order of the trial court 
except as to the award of $1900 in personal 
representative fees. That portion of the 
judgment is reversed. The case is remanded 
to the trial court for entry of a new judgment 
consistent with this opinion. 
DAVIS, Associate P J., and JACKSON, J., 
concur. 
( O I«TNUM81RSYSTIM> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Lewis Ricky YATES, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 950444-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 23, 1996. 
Defendant was convicted of class A mis-
demeanor theft, following plea agreement be-
fore the Third District Court, Salt Lake City, 
Leslie A- Lewis, J. Defendant appealed his 
sentence. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., 
held that: (1) defendant was required to be 
sentenced pursuant to statute amended fol-
lowing entry of plea agreement but prior to 
his actual sentencing, and (2) defendant's 
failure to appear for sentencing did not affect 
his entitlement to lesser punishment set 
forth in amended statute. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, J., concurred in result only, with 
opinion. 
1. Criminal Law o=»1134(3) 
Whether defendant is entitled to lesser 
sentence when legislature reduces penalty 
for crime charged after conviction but before 
sentencing is question of law, to be reviewed 
by Court of Appeals for correctness accord-
ing no deference to trial court's conclusions. 
2. Criminal Law <£=>1134(3) 
Whether defendant's dilatory conduct af-
fects his entitlement to lesser sentence is 
question of law, to be reviewed by Court of 
Appeals for correctness according no defer-
ence to trial court's conclusions. 
3. Criminal Law 0=>1134(6) 
Appellate court may affirm decision of 
trial court on any proper ground. 
4. Criminal Law e=>1130(5) 
State's failure to cite to any helpful au-
thority in support of its contention that re-
sentencing defendant, convicted of class A 
misdemeanor theft following plea agreement, 
pursuant to statute amended following entry 
of agreement but prior to actual sentencing 
deprived state of benefit of its bargain under 
contract theory precluded Court of Appeals 
from considering such argument for first 
time on appeal. 
5. Criminal Law e=1206.3(2) 
Defendants are entitled to benefit of 
lesser penalty afforded by amended statute 
made effective subsequent to their commis-
sion of offense and prior to their sentencing, 
punishment is imposed as deterrent to crime, 
as means of removing offender as harm from 
society, and as means of rehabilitation of 
offender, and not as punishment, and if legis-
lature finds reduction in the penalty for given 
crime necessary and appropriate to meet 
those goals, then lesser penalty should be 
granted to all defendants sentenced subse-
quent to modification. 
property. Thus, she could not take the settle- ment as an intestate hetr. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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BENCH, Judge: 
Neil Mitchell appeals the trial court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Marjorie Sims's estate. Lynda Wood cross-
appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND 
Grant and Marjorie Sims enjoyed a long married life 
together. Mr. Sims died in 1991, leaving a will which provided 
for the creation of a bypass trust and designated Mrs. Sims the 
personal representative of his estate. He also named Mrs. Sims 
and Mitchell co-trustees of the bypass trust, which was to be 
funded from the residue of his estate. The will provided that 
trust income was to be paid to Mrs. Sims, without condition. The 
will further provided that the trustees were required tt 
distribute to Mrs. Sims as much tf the principal as necessary for 
her proper health, support, and maintenance. After Mrs. Sims's 
death, the residue of the trust's corpus was to be distributed to 
other beneficiaries, including bcth Mitchell and Weed. 
During the time that Mrs. Sims served as personal 
representative, she never funded the trust. Instead, she 
withdrew S56,642.55 directly from the estate checking account to 
pay for her personal living and rr.edical excesses. Mrs. Sims 
received an additional S52,875.4C from the estate, derived from a 
550,000 certificate cf deposit plus interest. Finally, Mrs. Sims 
received a S12.445.66 personal injury settlement for injuries Mr. 
Sims had sustained before his death. 
Mrs. Sims died in 1953.' Her will named Wood as the personal 
representative cf her estate. Mitchell, as cc-trustee and a 
remainder person of Mr. Sims's estate, filed a claim against Mrs. 
Sims's estate for the monies that Mrs. Sims had removed from Mr. 
Sims's estate. Wood conceded that $48,100 frcm the certificate 
of deposit in Mr. Sims's name had been wrongfully taken from Mr. 
Sims's estate.1 Mitchell moved fcr summary judgment fcr return 
of all the funds removed from Mr. Sims's estate. Wood also filed 
for summary judgment seeking to disallow Mitchell's claim. 
The trial court granted in part and denied in part bcth 
parties' motions for summary judgment. The trial court found 
that Mrs. Sims had failed to fund the trust, but that she was 
nonetheless entitled to the $96,642.55 frcm the estate checking 
account. The trial court determined that the funds were used for 
her necessary support and maintenance and that there was 
therefore no damage to Mr. Sims's estate. Regarding the 
certificate of deposit, the trial court found that $48,100 was 
undisputediy owed by Mrs. Sims's estate and ordered that amount 
paid to Mr. Sims's estate plus 10% interest. The trial court 
also allcwed Mrs. Sims's estate to retain the $2875.40 in 
interest income from the certificate of deposit and the $1900 
claimed as personal representative fees. Finally, the trial 
court found that Mrs. Sims's acceptance of „ne $12,44 5.3S 
personal injury settlement was an improper diversion of the money 
from Mr. Sims's estate and awarded that amount to Mr. Sims's 
estate. 
Mitchell appeals from the trial court's decision ccncerning 
the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims withdrew from the estate checking 
1. Wood argued that Mrs. Sims's estate was entitled tc the 
$2875.40 in interest and an additional $1900 as personal 
representative fees. 
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a c c o u n t and t h e a l l owance of i n t e r e s t income and p e r s o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f e e s from t h e c e r t i f i c a t e cf d e p o s i t . Weed c r o s s -
a p p e a l s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s summary judgment in f a v o r of Mr. S i m s ' s 
e s t a t e on t h e p e r s o n a l i n j u r y s e t t l e m e n t amount and award of 
i n t e r e s t . 
STANDARD C? REVIEW 
Summary judgment i s a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y when no genuine i s s u e s 
cf m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t and t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d to 
judement as a m a t t e r cf law. Utah R. C i v . ? . 56 (c ) ; K i r r i n s v . 
S a l t Lake County , 855 P.2d 2 3 1 , 225 (Utah 1553) . Because 
e n t i t l e m e n t t o summary judgment i s a q u e s t i o n of l aw , we a c c o r d 
no d e f e r e n c e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n of t h e l e g a l i s s u e s 
p r e s e n t e d . I d . : F e r r e e v . S t a t e . 784 P .2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) . 
ANALYSIS 
A. Estate Checking Account 
Mitchell first argues that the trial court erred when it 
allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to keep the $96,£42.55 that Mrs. Sims 
had drawn from the checking account of Mr. Sims's estate. 
Mitchell contends that because Mrs. Sims did not fund the trust 
provided for in Mr. Sims's will, she must return all the money to 
Mr. Sims's estate. We disagree. 
Mr. Sims declared in his will that 
[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs. 
Sims] without any conditions, all of the 
income of said trust. The trustees shall 
also distribute as much of the principal as 
is necessary for her proper health, support, 
and maintenance and to maintain her in the 
standard of living that she enjoyed during my 
lifetime. 
The trial court found that although Mrs. Sims did not fund the 
trust, she was entitled to the funds since they were used for her 
support and maintenance. The record reflects that Mrs. Sims 
spent approximately $76,000 from the estate's checking account on 
her medical expenses. The balance of the money drawn from the 
estate1s checking account was for Mrs. Sims's living expenses. 
The accounting report and affidavit of the accountant for Mr. 
Sims's estate confirm these expenses. Mitchell did not dispute 
Mrs. Sims's expenses, contending merely that the expense 
accounting was irrelevant because any money used was "irnproperly 
950734-CA 3 
converted from the estate." Because Mitchell did net challenge 
Mrs. Sims's expenses below, he is precluded from challenging them 
on appeal. Jensen v. ^cwcut, 8S2 ?.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 
App.)(holding acquiescence to opposing argument before trial 
court precluded challence on aoTseal) , cert, denied. 895 ?.2d 1231 
(Utah 1955); see alsc Salt Lake~C->v y. Ohms . 881 P. 2d = 44, 847 
(Utah 1994} (stating court will review only chose issues 
presented below unless exceptional circumstances or plain error 
are shewn) .2 
The language of -he will clearly states -hat Mrs. Sims shall 
receive distributions from the principal of Mr. Sims ' s estate 
"necessary for her prccer heath, support, and maintenance.ff 
Mitchell argues that, in other jurisdictions, the use cf "as is 
necessary" language requires the beneficiaries of a trust to 
exhaust their own resources before invadinc trust principal. See 
Dunklee v. ^etterinc. 225 P.2d 852, 855-57~ (Ccio. 1950)/ But See 
In re Eg-.S-e cf Lindcren. 885 P. 2d 1280, 1252-53 (Mont. 1994). 
We need net address that question because Mr. Sims's will does 
not merely authorize the invasion cf the principal for "the 
necessities of life." Dunklee. 225 P.2d at S53. Instead, Mr. 
Sims's will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall have access tt the 
principal "to maintain her [Mrs. Sims] in the standard cf living 
that she enjoyed during my lifetime." Therefcre, we agree with 
the trial court•s determination that "while there was a technical 
breach of her fiduciary responsibilities tc fund the bypass 
trusty the breach resulted in no damages and therefcre is not 
actionable." 
B. Certificate of Deposit 
Mitchell challenges the trial court's award to Mrs. Sims's 
estate of S1900 in personal representative fees and $2875.40 that 
Mrs. Sims claimed as interest earned from Mr. Sims's $50,000 
certificate of deposit. Mitchell first argues that Mrs. Sims's 
estate did not properly petition the trial court for the $1900 in 
claimed personal•representative fees pursuant to Utah Cede Ann. § 
75-3-718(1) (1993) . Wood stated in her Memorandum in Response to 
Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment that she deducted from the 
$50,000 "$1900 as fees for acting as personal representative." 
We need not decide whether this qualifies as a proper claim 
2. Mitchell also claims that Wood should be estopped from 
claiming Mrs. Sims's estate had no liability towards Mr. Simsfs 
estate. Mitchell concedes that estoppel is a new argument but 
contends that it is not a new issue. However, "[w]e decline to 
honor such a distinction." Ong Int' 1 (U.S.A.i Inc. v. nth Ave. 
Corp. . 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993). Consequently, we will 
not address the estccoel issue. 
pursuant to section 75-2-713(1), since Wood provided r.c evidence 
to support the fees after Mitchell challenged them on summary 
judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 5£'c) . Consequently, we reverse 
that portion of the award. 
Mitchell also asserts that the trial court improperly 
awarded Mrs. Sims's estate $2875.40 in claimed interest from the 
certificate of deposit. Wood argues that the money was interest 
earned from the certificate of deposit in Mr. Sims's name and 
that, since Mr. Sims's will declared Mrs. Sims the beneficiary of 
all income from Mr. Sims's estate, she was entitled to >eep the 
interest earned. Mitchell simply contends that because the trust 
was not funded, Mrs. Sims did net have the right to keep that 
money. We disagree. Again, although Mrs. Sims did net fund the 
trust as Mr. Sims's will directed, Mr. Sims explicitly stated 
that Mrs. Sims was to receive the income from Mr. Sims's estate 
"without condition." Thus, the trial court properly allowed Mrs. 
Sims's estate to retain the interest from the certificate of 
deposit. 
C. Settlement Proceeds 
Wood cross-appeals the trial court's order to return to Mr. 
Sims's estate the $12,445.86 received from the settlement of Mr. 
Sims's personal injury claim. Weed argues that since Mrs. Sims 
claims to have paid a large portion of Mr. Sims's medical 
expenses, Mrs. Sims could retain the settlement proceeds pursuant 
to Ufr&h's survival statute. £££ Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 
(1992). Utah's survival statute provides: 
If prior to judgment or settlement the 
injured person dies as a result of a cause 
other than the injury received as a result of 
the wrongful act or negligence of the 
wrongdoer, the personal representative or 
heirs of that person are entitled to receive 
no more than the out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred by or on behalf of that injured 
person as the result of his injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) (b) (1992) . According to Utah's 
survival statute, Mrs. Sims could only recover the personal 
injury settlement in her capacity as personal representative of 
Mr. Sims's estate. Wood's reliance on In re Behm's Est—e. 117 
Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950) for the argument that she is 
entitled to the settlement proceeds is misplaced. Behn is a 
wrongful death case and not a personal injury settlement case. 
In a wrongful death cause of action, the heirs of the decedent 
personally hold claims for lost support and other personal 
losses. See Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2cf878, 879 (Utah App. 1994). 
950734-CA 5 
In a personal injury case, by comparison, the cause of action is 
owned not by the heirs, but by the injured party. As personal 
representative of Mr. Sims's estate, Mrs. Sims was therefore 
authorized to receive the settlement only en behalf of his 
estate. Mrs. Sims could then present a claim to his estate for 
out-of-pocket expenses, pursuant to the survival statute. She 
has never done that.3 We therefore affirm the trial ccurt's 
award of the settlement proceeds to Mr. Sims's estate. 
We have considered the other issues raised, and we adjudge 
them to be without merit. Accordingly, we do not address them. 
Se* Star* v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) ("Court need 
not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue 
or claim" raised.") , cert, denied."i16 S. Ct. 163 (1995;. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the order of the crial court except as to the 
award of S1S00 in personal representative fees. That portion of 
the judgment is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial 
court for entry of a new judgment consistent with this opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
3. Mrs. Sims's estate argues that because she was Mr. Sims's 
"only surviving intestate heir," she is entitled to the 
settlement proceeds. However, it is evident that Mr. Sims did 
not die intestate. Ke had a will that designated Mrs. Sims as 
the personal representative, and devisee of personal property. 
Thus, she could not take the settlement as an intestate heir. 
Qc^nniA _r*^  
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APPENDIX B 
PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 75-3-711 
possessed by the personal representative. 
Thus, if the power is unexercised prior to its 
termination, its lapse clears the title of devi-
sees and heirs. Purchasers from devisees or 
heirs who are "distributees" may be protected 
also by § 75-3-910. The power over title of an 
absolute owner is conceived to embrace all pos-
sible transactions which might result in a con-
veyance or encumbrance of assets, or in a 
change of rights of possession. The relationship 
of the personal representative to the estate is 
that of a trustee. Hence, personal creditors or 
successors of a personal representative cannot 
75-3-711. Improper exercise 
^^c iary duty. 
Historv: C. 1953, 75-3-711, enacted bv L. 
1975, ch. 150, i 4. 
Editorial Board Comment. — An inter-
ested person has two principal remedies to 
forestall a personal representative from com-
mitting a breach of fiduciary duty, d ) Under 
§ 75-3-607 he may apply to the court for an 
order restraining the personal representative 
from performing any specified act or from exer-
cising any power in the course of administra-
tion. (2) Under § 75-3-611 he may petition the 
court for an order removing the personal repre-
sentative. 
Evidence of a proceeding, or order, restrain-
ing a personal representative from selling, 
leasing, encumbering or otherwise affecting ti-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors 
and Administrators § 528. 
C.J.S. — 33 CJ.S. Executors and Adminis-
trators §§ 184, 207, 210 to 213, 215, 219, 220, 
242 to 251, 272, 322. 
A.L.R. — Liability of executor or adminis-
trator for negligence or default in defending 
action against estate, 14 A.L.R.3d 1036. 
Agent or attorney, liability of executor or ad-
ministrator, or his bond, for loss caused to es-
tate by act or default of his, 28 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
avail themselves of his title to any greater ex-
tent than is true generally of creditors and suc-
cessors of trustees. Interested persons who are 
apprehensive of possible misuse of power by a 
personal representative may secure them-
selves by use of the devices implicit in the sev-
eral sections of Parts 1 and 3 of this chapter. 
See especially §§ 75-3-501, 75-3-605. 75-3-607 
and 75-3-611. 
Compiler's Notes. — The corresponding 
section in the official text of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code is numbered § 3-711. 
of power — Breach of fidu-
tle to real property subject to administration, if 
properly recorded under the laws of this state, 
would be effective to prevent a purchaser from 
acquiring a marketabie title under the usual 
rules relating to recordation of real property 
titles. 
In addition. $$ 75-1-302 and 75-3-105 autho-
rize joinder of third persons who may be in-
volved in contemplated transactions with a 
personal representative in proceedings to re-
strain a personal representative under 
* 75-3-607. 
Compiler's Notes. — The corresponding 
section in the ofTiciai text of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code is numbered § 3-712. 
Liability of executor, administrator, trustee, 
or his counsel for interest, penalty, or extra 
taxes assessed against estate because of tax 
law violations, 47 A.L.R.3d 507. 
Overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax, lia-
bility of executor or administrator to estate be-
cause of, 55 A.L.R.3d 785. 
Garnishment against executor or adminis-
trator by creditor of estate, 60 A.L.R.3d 1301. 
Key Numbers. — Executors and Adminis-
trators «=• 91, 103, 104, 116 to 120. 
" tflKe exercise of power concerning the estate is improper, the personal 
representative is liable to interested persons fqrjamage or loss rjsultin£Xrom 
breach of his fiduciary duty to the same extefflfasa trustee oi'arfexpress trust. 
The rights of purchasers and others dealing with a personal representative 
shall be determined as provided in Sections 75-3-712 and 75-3-713. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
OF: 
: CASE NO. 933900278 
MARJORIE 8. SIMS, 
Deceased. 
The above-referenced matter is before the Court on reciprocal 
Motions for Summary Judgment. The petitioner, Neil Mitchell, as 
successor personal representative of the Estate of G. Grant Sims, 
originally filed his Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an Order 
from this Court that the original personal representative of the 
Estate of G. Grant Sims, prior to her demise, failed to act in 
accordance with Mr. Sims' Will in funding a bypass trust, and was 
therefore required to return to Mr. Sims7 Estate certain funds 
which the petitioner believes were inappropriately used by Mrs. 
Sims- Inasmuch as Mrs. Sims is deceased, the petitioner seeks 
repayment from the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims. 
The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, through its personal 
representative Lynda Wood, has filed in response to the 
aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment, a counter Motion for 
Summary Judgment seeking from this Court an Order that the Estate 
of G. Grant Sims is not entitled to repayment of sums used by Mrs. 
Sims during her lifetime in her capacity as personal representative 
SIMS ESTATE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of Mr. Sims1 Estate. The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims does agree, 
however, that certain cash funds retained by Mrs, Sims while she 
was acting as personal representative of the Estate of Mr. Sims 
should be returned and has offered to return $48,100 of the 
$52,875.40 that the petitioner claimed was not deposited into Mr. 
Sims' Estate accounts. The difference between the $48,100 and the 
$52,875.40 are outlined in the Memoranda filed by Mr. McCoy on 
behalf of Lynda Wood, personal representative of the Marjorie S. 
Sims Estate, and have not been challenged as being inappropriate by 
the petitioner. 
While it is without dispute in this matter that Mrs. Sims as 
personal representative did not fund the trust as her deceased 
husband's Will provided, the manner in which she used the funds 
were, as a matter of law, funds that she would have been entitled 
to receive had she funded the trust as Mr. Sims' Will provided. The 
terms of the trust would have allowed Mrs. Sims to receive the 
funds she took, without any depletion of her own funds. 
Accordingly, while there was a technical breach of her fiduciary 
responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach resulted in 
no damages and therefore is not actionable. 
The intent of Mr. Sims was to benefit his spouse, rather than 
conserve his Estate for residual beneficiaries. That purpose was 
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adhered to by Mrs. Sims, albeit not in strict compliance with the 
formal procedures his Will required. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the Estate 
of Marjorie Sims has no obligation to repay the Estate of G. Grant 
Sims, with the exception of the $48,100 which the personal 
representative of Marjorie Sims has offered to return heretofore. 
As those funds should properly be with the Estate of Grant Sims, 
the Estate of Marjorie Sims is to repay that amount to his Estate 
forthwith. 
There is a question regarding funds received by Mrs. Sims in 
her capacity as personal representative of Mr. Sims' Estate for 
personal injury and a subsequent settlement after Mr. Sims died. 
The evidence is undisputed that the personal injury claim arose 
before Mr. Sims' death, but was settled after his death. The 
applicable statutory provisions provide that the only claims that 
survive a death are claims for expenses related to the injury, 
where the death of the personal injury claimant is not related to 
the personal injury claim. The settlement was for $12,445.86, and 
as it was received after the death of Mr. Sims, it was for actual 
expenses incurred by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury, 
and pursuant to statute is required to be paid over to the personal 
representative of the deceased's (Mr. Sims') Estate, or the heirs 
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of the deceased if a death was intestate. As Mr. Sims did not die 
intestate, the funds were properly paid to Mrs. Sims in her 
capacity as personal representative, and should have been deposited 
in the accounts for the Estate, the funds representing expenses 
incurred personally by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury 
case. 
Accordingly, the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims is also required 
to repay the Estate of G. Grant Sims the sum of $12,445.86, 
representing an improper diversion of the personal injury 
settlement funds received by Mrs. Sims after her husband's death. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court has granted the Summary 
Judgment of the petitioner, Neil Mitchell, in part as it relates to 
the personal injury settlement funds, and has granted the Summary 
Judgment of the personal representative of the Marjorie S. Sims 
Estate in part. The Court determines that the amounts to be paid 
from Marjorie S. Sims Estate to the G. Grant Sims Estate of $48,100 
is not subject to this Summary Judgment, even though the Order 
should contain a requirement for such payment based upon the fact 
that said sums have been offered and outstanding for some 
substantial period of time and have not really been at issue. 
Counsel for the parties are to confer and determine the manner 
in which an appropriate Order encompassing the decisions of this 
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Court on the reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment can be 
drafted. Inasmuch as the Court has partially granted each Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Order needs to provide that an approval 
as to form, or the participation in the preparation of an Order 
encompassing the Court's rulings on these reciprocal Motions for 
Summary Judgment does not constitute a waiver of either side to 
object and pursue an appropriate appeal in relation to the Court's 
ruling contained in the Order. 
Once the Order has been properly prepared and approved by both 
sides as being reflective of this Court's decision, the same should 
be submitted to the Court for its reviey/and signature pursuant to 
the Code of Judicial Administration./ 
LIS Dated th: Iday of March/ 1995. 
M^mKMJ 
'TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OP AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUW ENT ON FILE IN THE THIRO 
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH. 
IfiNO^— 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this, .day of 
March, 1995: 
John L. McCoy 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
Lynda Wood 
310 S. Main, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John E. Gates 
Kim R, Wilson 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Neil Mitchell 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
JOHN E. GATES (A1169) 
KIM R. WILSON (A3512) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell, Successor 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of G. Grant Sims 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
of 
MARJORIE S. SIMS, Probate No. 933900278 ES 
Timothy R. Hanson 
Deceased. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Neil R. Mitchell 
("Mitchell"), as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate 
of G. Grant Sims (the "Motion for Summary Judgment") seeking 
allowance of Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of 
Claim and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Lynda Wood as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims (the 
"Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment") 'seeking denial of Mitchell's 
First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim came on for hearing 
pursuant to notice, before the above-entitled court, the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, on January 13, 1995, at 
2:00 p.m. and Kim R. Wilson appeared for Mitchell and John L. 
McCoy appeared for Wood, and the Court having considered the 
Th,rcUuc;ci2J D ^ c / 
m
 ? 0 las 
motions, the memoranda and affidavits supporting and opposing the 
motions and the files and records herein, having heard arguments 
of counsel, having issued its Memorandum Decision dated March 13, 
1995, which is incorporated herein by reference, and being fully 
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Mitchell's entitlement to payment of the sum of 
$48,100.00 is not contested, and Wood, be and the same is hereby 
directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of 548,100.00 
together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993, until paid 
at the statutory rate of 10% per annum. 
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
3. The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in 
part and denied in part. 
4. In addition to the amounts provided in Paragraph 1, 
Mitchell!s claim is approved and allowed in the sum of $12,445.86 
and Wood is directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of 
$12,445.86 together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993, 
until paid, at the statutory rate of io% per annum. 
5. Recovery is denied for all other amounts sought in 
Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
-2-
6. In accordance with Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court determines that there is no just reason for 
delay, and this Order is deemed to be a ferial judgment. 
DATED this nQ day of 1995. 
A imothy R. HansorT^^ .7 District Court Judg^ J? 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSE1 TINEAU 
'Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell, 
Successor Personal Representative 
of the Estate of G. Grant Sims 
hn L. McCoy 
ttorney for Lynda Woo^" Personal 
Representative ox the Estate 
of Marjorie S/Sims 
u^cia^^— 
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Third Judicial District 
OEC 2 ^ 1991 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
GEORGE GRANT SIMS 
I, GEORGE GRANT SIMS, a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby make and 
publish this, my Last Will and Testament. 
ARTICLE £ 
REVOCATION OF PRIOR WILLS AND CODICILS 
I hereby revoke all other wills and codicils heretofore made 
by me, 
ARTICLE II 
WIFE AND BENEFICIARIES 
I am married to MARJORIE S. SIMS ( h e r e i n a f t e r re ferred to as 
"my w i f e " ) . The b e n e f i c i a r y of my e s t a t e w i l l be my wi fe ( e i t h e r 
o u t r i g h t or in t r u s t , or b o t h , as h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h ) o r , i f 
s h e p r e d e c e a s e s me, the b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f my e s t a t e s h a l l be t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l s named or i n d i c a t e d in A r t i c l e V* 
ARTICLE I I I 
PAYMENT OF TAXES, DEBTS AND EXPENSES 
I direct that all of my due and unpaid debts, all expenses 
of my last illness, burial, and the administration of my estate, 
and all taxes due at the date of my death or as a result of my 
death, shall be paid as soon after my death as practical. 
ARTICLE .IV 
BEQUEST OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND EFFECTS 
I h e r e b y g i v e , d e v i s e and b e q u e a t h c e r t a i n i t e m s of my 
t a n g i b l e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y t o t h o s e p e r s o n s i n t h e m a n n e r s e t 
f o r t h i n a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t o r l i s t w h i c h h a s b e e n , o r w h i c h 
w i l l b e , p r e p a r e d , d a t e d and s i g n e d by me and a t t a c h e d t o t h i s 
W i l l and w h i c h s t a t e m e n t o r l i s t I i n t e n d t o be i n e x i s t e n c e a t 
t h e t i m e of my d e a t h . Sa id l i r t d e s c r i b e s t h e i t e m s d e v i s e d and 
t h e d e v i s e e s t h e r e o f . A l l of t h e r e s t and r e s i d u e of my p e r s o n a l 
e f f e c t s , i n c l u d i n g a l l househo ld f u r n i t u r e and c o n t e n t s / j e w e l r y , 
a u t o m o b i l e s , and t h e l i k e , I l e a v e t o my w i f e i f she s u r v i v e s me. 
However , i f my w i f e p r e d e c e a s e s me, a l l of my p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y 
and e f f e c t s n o t s e t f o r t h i n t h e a t t a c h e d l i s t s h a l l become a 
p a r t o f t h e r e s i d u e of my e s t a t e a n d b e d i s p o s e d of a s 
h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h . 
ARTICLE V 
BEQUEST OF RESIDUE £F ESTATE 
I f my w i f e s u r v i v e s me, my p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a l l 
d i v i d e t h e r e s i d u e of my e s t a t e i n t o t w o p a r t s , h e r e i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d t o a s P a r t A ( t h e "GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX BYPASS 
TRUSTP) a n d P a r t B ( t h e "MARJORIE S. SIMS MARITAL DEDUCTION 
PORTION") e a c h a s c e r t a i n e d a s h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h i n A r t i c l e 
V I I I . 
2 #?£ 
The Harjorie S. Sims Marital Deduction Portion shall be 
distributed as soon after my death as practical to my wife 
outright and tree of trust* 
The George Grant Sims Estate Tax Bypass Trust shall be held 
in Trust by the Trustees hereinafter named for the benefit of my 
wife during her lifetime. The Trustees shall distribute to her 
without any conditions, all of the income of said trust. The 
Trustees shall also distribute as mu;:h of the principal as is 
necessary for her proper health, support, and maintenance and to 
maintain her in the standard ot living that she enjoyed during my 
lifetime. Upon the death of my wife, the Trustee shall pay to 
the following persons, the following specific sums: 
$10,000.00 to DONALD E. SMITH, MD 
$10,000.00 to MARK MUIR, MD 
The Trustee shall then distribute the residue of this Trust 
in the following manner: 
ONE-THIRD: ELNA MITCHELL 
ONE-THIRD: NEIL MITCHELL 
ONE-THIRD: LINDA WOOD 
If any of the above individuals, except LINDA WOOD, are 
then deceased, his or her share shall be distributed to his or 
her issue by right of representation. As to LINDA WOOD, if she 
should be deceased at the time of my death, then her share shall 
3 
I 
be d i s t r i b u t e d t o IAN MITCHELL and AMY MITCHELL, in equal s h a r e s . 
I f my w i f e p r e d e c e a s e s me, t h e r e s i d u e of my e s t a t e s h a l l be 
d i s t r i b u t e d t o : DONALD E. SMITH, MD. and MARK MUIR, MD.# 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 « 0 0 each and t o ELNA MITCHELL, NEIL MITCHELL and LINDA 
WOOD, o n e - t h i r d e a c h , b u t i f any of them, e x c e p t LINDA WOOD, 
p r e d e c e a s e m e , t h e n t o h i s o r h e r i s s u e by r i g h t o f 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I f LINDA WOOD p r e d e c e a s e s me, t h e n her s h a r e 
s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d t o IAN MITCHELL and AMY MITCHEL%, 'in equal 
s h a r e s -
ARTICLE VI 
COMMON DISASTER 
In t h e e v e n t my w i f e and I d i e u n d e r sucft c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t 
i t c a n n o t be d e t e r m i n e d w h i c h of u s were f i r s t t o d i e , a l l 
p r o p e r t i e s o t my e s t a t e s h a l l be a d m i n i s t e r e d as though my w i f e 
were t h e l a s t t o d i e * 
ARTICLE VII 
APPOINTMENT OF FIDUCIARIES 
1* A p p o i n t m e n t o f P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I a p p o i n t my 
w i f e t o b e P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f my W i l l , I f my w i f e d o e s 
n o t s u r v i v e me or i s o t h e r w i s e u n a b l e or u n w i l l i n g t o s e r v e a s 
p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , then I appoint my nephew, NEIL MITCHELL, 
t o s e r v e a s c o - p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of my e s t a t e . In t h e 
e v e n t b o t h a r e u n a b l e o r u n w i l l i n g t o s e r v e a s P e r s o n a l 
4 
Representative of my Will, the Personal Representative shall be 
IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL. 
2. Appointment of Trustees. I appoint my wife and NEIL 
MITCHELL, to be the co-trustees of the George Grant Sims Estate 
Tax Bypass Trust created under this Will. In the event either 
Trustee is unable or unwilling to serve, the other of them shall 
serve as Trustee. In the event both are unable or unwilling to 
servef the other of them shall serve as Trustee. In the ^vent 
both are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the Trustee 
shall be IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL. 
3. Appointment of Guardian and Conservator. In the event I 
become incompetent during my lifetime, I direct that my wife be 
appointed the guardian of my person and the conservator ot my 
estate. If she is unable or unwilling to serve, I direct that 
NEIL MITCHELL be appointed guardian and conservator or, if he is 
unable or unwilling to serve, then IAN MITCHELL, his son shall 
serve as the sole guardian and conservator. My guardian and 
conservator shall serve without bond. I direct that as long as 
there are funds available I be taken care of in my home and not 
placed in a nursing home or similar facility unless home care is 
impossible because of the nature of the care required. It is my 
desire and direction that whatever funds are necessary be spent 
for my support, care and maintenance without regard or concern 
5 qaC 
f o r c o n s e r v i n g any p o r t i o n o f my e s t a t e f o r s u b s e q u e n t 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s t h e r e o f . 
ARTICLE VIII 
ASCERTAINMENT OF GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX BYPASS TRUST 
AND MARJORIE S^ SIMS MARITAL DEDUCTION PORTION. 
I f my w i f e s u r v i v e s me, P a r t A and P a r t B as s e t f o r t h i n 
A r t i c l e V s h a l l be a s c e r t a i n e d as f o l l o w s : 
1 . T h e r e s h a l l f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d t h e v a l u e of toy g r o s s 
e s t a t e { i n c l u d i n g proper ty not a d m i n i s t e r e d in my e s t a t e ) for the 
purpose of t h e Uni ted S t a t e s Federa l E s t a t e Tax, 
2. There s h a l l be deducted from such v a l u e the amount/ t o 
t h e e x t e n t a l l o w a b l e as a d e d u c t i o n i n t h e c o m p u t a t i o n of t h e 
Federa l E s t a t e Tax, of a l l t u n e r a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e x p e n s e s , 
and a l l c l a i m s a g a i n s t my e s t a t e but t h e r e s h a l l no t be deducted 
any e s t a t e , i n h e r i t a n c e , t r a n s f e r , l e g a c y or s u c c e s s i o n t a x e s , 
r e f e r r e d t o i n A r t i c l e I I I . The amount s o d e t e r m i n e d s h a l l be 
pa id out pursuant t o A r t i c l e I I I above. 
3 . Part A s h a l l be equal t o the amount ( c u r r e n t l y $600,000) 
t h a t may p a s s f r e e of Federal E s t a t e Tax by reason ot the U n i f i e d 
C r e d i t A g a i n s t Tax u n d e r S e c t i o n 2010 of t h e I n t e r n a l Revenue 
Code of 1986 , as amended (or i t s s u c c e s s o r ) reduced by the t o t a l 
o f (1) a l l i t e m s i n c l u d a b l e i n my e s t a t e f o r f e d e r a l e s t a t e t a x 
purposes which are d i s p o s e d of i n p r e v i o u s A r t i c l e s ot t h i s W i l l 
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or which pass outside of this Will but only if such items do not 
qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction or the 
federal estate tax charitable deduction, and (2) the amount of 
any administration expenses claimed as income tax rather than 
estate tax deductions. Part A shall be held, administered and 
distributed as set forth in Article V. 
For purposes o£ allocating my residuary estate between Part 
A and Part B, all property owned by me at the time of my death 
shall be valued at the same value that was used for federal 
estate tax purposes. If I should die possessed of any terminable 
or other interest which cannot quality for the "marital 
deduction" under the Federal Estate Tax law, such interest shall 
be allocated to this Part A. If there are any federal or state 
estate and inheritance taxes due and payable on my death, they 
shall be paid out of the toregoing assets allocated to Part A. 
No estate taxes shall be paid out of Part B. 
4. Part B shall consist ot the rest, residue and remainder 
of my estate not disposed of pursuant to the foregoing provisions 
of my Will, I hereby direct that whenever possible, assets that 
will qualify for the federal estate tax "marital deduction" shall 
be allocated to Part B after, however, Part A is properly funded. 
If there are assets that will not qualify for the marital 
deduction I direct that those assets be allocated, to the extent 
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poss ib le without exceeding the l i m i t s s e t forth above, to Part A 
above* If there are a s s e t s t h a t w i l l cause the l i m i t a t i o n s on 
Part A to be exceeded, those a s s e t s s h a l l be a l located to Part B 
a l though they w i l l not q u a l i f y for the m a r i t a l d e d u c t i o n . The 
d e c i s i o n of my Persona l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e as t o the property t o be 
a l located t o Part A and Part B s h a l l be f i n a l and conclus ive and 
binding upon a l l b e n e f i c i a r i e s . However, the property a l loca ted 
t o Part B s h a l l have an a g g r e g a t e f a i r market value- c l e a r l y 
representat ive of the appreciat ion or depreciat ion in the value 
to the date of d a t e s of each d i s t r i b u t i o n of a l l property then 
a v a i l a b l e for d i s t r i b u t i o n . Part B s h a l l not be d imin i shed by 
any e s t a t e , inher i tance , t rans fer , legacy or success ion taxes or 
d u t i e s , e i t h e r s t a t e or f e d e r a l . If the va lue of my re s iduary 
e s t a t e i s l e s s than the amount tha t may be a l l o c a t e d t o Part A 
(currently $600,000), no part ot my e s t a t e sha l l be a l located to 
Part B. 
ARTICLE IX 
TRUSTEE POWERS 
Trustee s h a l l have the addit ional powers, a u t h o r i t i e s , and 
d i s c r e t i o n s s e t f o r t h in Part 4, Chapter 7, T i t l e 75 of the 
Uniform Trustees' Powers Provis ions of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code (or i t s s u c c e s s o r ) , which are i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n by 
reference . 
e 
1/ GEORGE GRANT SIMS, the T e s t a t o r , s i g n my name to t h i s 
ins trument t h i s J l ^ day of Ju ly , 1991, and being f i r s t duly 
sworn# do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that I sign 
i t w i l l i n g l y (or w i l l i n g l y d irect another to s ign for me), that I 
e x e c u t e i t as my f r e e and v o l u n t a r y a c t f o r the p u r p o s e s 
expressed in i t , and t h a t I am e i g h t e e n (18) years of age or 
o lder , of sound minef and under no ccffifstp^aint or urjj^ ue ij^iyence, 
GEORGE GRANT SIMS/ Testator 
WE, the unders igned / as w i t n e s s e s , s i g n our names t o 
t h i s instrument, being f i r s t duly sworn, and do hereby declare to 
the unders igned a u t h o r i t y that the T e s t a t o r s i g n s and execute 
t h i s instrument as h is Last Will and Testament and that he s igns 
i t w i l l i n g l y and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of 
the T e s t a t o r and or each o t h e r , hereby s i g n s t h i s Wi l l as w i t n e s s 
to the Testator's s ign ing , and that to the best of our knowledge 
the T e s t a t o r i s 18 y e a r s of age or o l d e r # of sound mind/ and 
under no constraint or undue influence* 
NAME ADDRESS 
m 
J*£Y £J^ &-i/o£ 
y& 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
) SS • 
STATE OF UTAH • ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me by GEORGE GRANT SIMS# 
t h e T e s t a t o r # o r , and s u b s c r i b e d a n d s w o r n t o b e f o r e me by 
l./Ll/Ati F* OV£ieTdKl and /to/fafo] £. D^M , 
witnesses , t h i s o?o? day of Ju ly , 1991. 
My Commission Expires: yy */
 : 
NOTARY 
Re s i d I n ^ ^ t ^ ^ v 
«••••„. r-rJT^H 
N ^ S ? - ' 310$ Mo* JWS.F.C UT WW I 
-C^M. ^-Y 
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